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Article 6

The Quinlan Case
John R. Connery, S.J.

Father Connery is currently on
the staff of the Kennedy Institute
of Bioethics at Georgetown University. He also serves on the
Editorial Advisory Board of Linacre. This article is reprinted with
permission from Hospital Progress, D ecember, 1975. Copyright
1975 by the Catholic Hospital
Association.

Directive n. 28 of the Ethical
and Religious Directives for Ca tholic Health Facilities reads in
part as follows: "The failure to
supply ordinary means of preserving life is equivalent to euthanasia. However, neither the physician nor the patient is obliged to
the use of extraordinary means."
Anyone reading this directive
may be puzzled at what seemed
to be the reaction of both doctors
and administration at St. Clare's
Hospital, Denville, New Jersey,
to the request of the parents of
Karen Ann Quinlan to remove the
respirator from their daughter and
let God's will be done. The parents had come to this decision
after prayer and consultation with
their local pastor. Being assured
that the decision was entirely
consistent with the teaching of
their Church, the father made the
request. Unfortunately, it met
with refusal.
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The girl was originally admitted into another hospital on April
15, 1975, in a comatose state, but
was soon (April 24) transferred to
St. Clare's. She had suffered massive and irreparable brain damage,
and has remained in a comatose
state since that time. She has
been on a respirator and has been
fed through a tube, and the doctors hold out little or no hope that
she can be taken off the respirator
in the foreseeable future .
The case would seem to be a
classic example of ext.raordinary
means. Such artificiallife-sustainers as respirators, etc., would not
be classified as extraordinary
means to relieve acute conditions
of short duration, but moral
theologians have commonly held
that long-term use of these sustainers would convert them into
extraordinary means. If the use
of such means has to become a
way of life for a patient, it becomes a real burden. This would
be true even if the patient was
conscious and the use of the sustainer offered real benefit. Hemodialysis, for instance, will let a
person suffering from chronic kidney shutdown lead a fairly normal life if he continues it. But if
it has to become a way of life for
such a patient, theologians would
see it as an excessively heavy burden to bear. If indeed a patient
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wants to continue life even in
these circumstances he has the
option of doing so. But to oblige
a patient to do so would in the
words of Pius XII "be too burdensome for most men and would
render the attainment of the higher, more important good too difficult." In the case of the Quinlan
girl the burden is at least as great,
and with little or no perceptible
benefit.
How can one account for the
negative reaction of the doctors
and the hospital to the request of
Mr. Quinlan? One must assume
that they were acquainted with
and had at least a minimal understanding of directive n. 28 quoted
above. Did they consider the use
of the respirator and other life
sustainers in this case ordinary
means? This is a possibility. They
might even have judged turning
off the respirator a lethal act, or
at least a violation of the doctor's
first norm: non nocere.
Obviously, there is a clear difference between turning off a
respirator and injecting an air
bubble into a patient's veins. The
latter is a real cause of death. The
respirator does no more than prevent natural causes of death from
taking their effect. When it is
turned off, death will result from
the same causes that would have
brought it about initially if the
respirator had not been used.
Turning off the respirator is in
no sense a positive cause of death.
It would be wrong, of course, not
to turn on a respirator, or to turn
it off, in a case where it would be
judged an ordinary means. But
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as an extraordinary means there
is no obligation to initiate it or
continue it.
Some doctors will scruple more
about discontinuing extraordinary means than about not initiating them. The underlying reason for this is perhaps a greater
moral sensitivity to acts of commission than to omission. This
sensitivity may be justified in
other contexts, but in the present
case it is not. There may be a psychological problem here, but clearly there is no moral problem. If
there is no obligation to initiate
extraordinary means, there is no
obligation to continue them . One
does not assume an obligation to
continue such means merely by
beginning to use them. It is quite
true that in the Quinlan case
there may have been an initial
obligation to use a respirator due
to the uncertainty of the prognosis. But if the doctors had
known at that time what they
know now, there would have been
no clear obligatio~ even t hen.
Some doctors may feel that it
is their duty to their profession
to use all available means, as long
as the patient is alive. This is in
many respects a commendable attitude. If this is what the patient
or relatives wish, the selflessness
of the doctor will be most appreciated. But even here I suspect
that the doctor himself would
recognize a limit. He has other
patients to take care of; he cannot
be totally available to anyone
patient. But there are other limitations as well. Professional conscientiousness does not entitle the
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doctor to override the legitimate
wishes of his patient. Here the
judicious words of Pius XII to
the International Congress of
Anaesthesiologists are pertinent:
"The doctor ... has no separate
or independent right where the
patient is concerned. In general
he can take action only if the patient explicitly or implicitly, directly or indirectly, gives his permission." The duty of the doctor
to his profession does not entitle
him to go counter to the wishes
of his patient, unless, of course,
the patient wishes him to do
something morally wrong. The
profession exists for the patient;
not the patient for the profession.
Since the patient has no obligation to use extraordinary means,
he is within his rights to refuse
them. And if he does, the doctor
has no right to impose them on
him.
VVould the request have been
granted if it came from the patient herself? Certainly, it is the
patient who has the basic right
to make the decision about using
extraordinary means. But it is
generally agreed that if the patient cannot make the decision, it
is the responsibility of her closest
relatives. They are presumably in
the best position to know what
the patient would want, and their
decision should ordinarily be in
accord with these wishes. If the
wishes of the patient are not clear
to the responsible relative, he
should make the best decision he
can in the circumstances. This
might very legitimately be the
decision he would make if he were
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in a similar situation. In the Quinlan case from statements which
the girl herself had made previously the parents had good reason to believe that she would not
have wanted extraordinary treatment. And since she was not
obliged to use such means, the
parents were within their rightH
in requesting their termination.
So there should have been no
hesitancy about the request because it did not come from the
patient herself.
There seems to be no justification or moral grounds for the
refusal of the doctors or the hospital to heed the request of the
Quinlan family. There may, however, be a legal problem. Everybody in the medical profession
is aware today of the plague of
malpractice suits afflicting it. The
doctors and the hospital in this
case may have been worried about
their liability to such a suit if they
had cooperated with the wishes of
the parents in the QuiI1lan case.
Even more serious would be liability to a criminal charge. This
is a present concern even in cases
where "brain death" has occurred,
but so-called "vital signs" are still
present due to the use of artificial
life sustainers. It would obviously
be more of a threat in such as the
Quinlan case where "brain death"
has certainly not occurred.
For several centuries moral
theologians have clearly distinguished between taking a life and
not using extraordinary means to
prolong it. Some of these theologians were jurists as well as
theologians, and so, knowledge27

able in the law. Domengo So to,
O.P. for instance, in his De lure
at lustitia discusses the obligation to undergo an amputation
(without anesthesia) and says:
"No one is bound to prolong life
with such pain; nor is he to be
considered a homicide for this
reason." Theologians after Soto
have spelled out this obligation
more in detail and formalized it in
the distinction between ordinary
and extraordinary means. They
may differ among themselves on
minor details, but on one point
they are unanimous. There is a
sharp distinction between homicide and failing to use extraordinary means. The u n d e r I yin g
reason is that there is a limit to
the obligation to prolong life. A
strong defense could be made
then against any charge of violating a homicide statute.
The danger of a malpractice
suit can hardly be discounted
when they are occurring with
such frequency. Even though
there is undoubtedly far less malpractice today than at any time
in the past (the practice of medicine was largely malpractice until
relatively recent times), there is
an unbelievable number of malpractice suits. This tells us more
about our times than it does
about the practice of medicine.
Interestingly enough, the threat
of the law can be at least as great
if the doctor tries to impose the
use of extraordinary means on a
patient. The present writer knows
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of a case where the wife of a patient threatened the doctor with
a charge of assault and battery
if he forced extraordinary means
on her husband.
This much should be said. If a
doctor or hospital judge that they
are doing the right thing, they
should not be deterred by the
fear of a malpractice suit. Fear
of such a suit may be healthy up
to a point-to the point that it
pre v e n t s malpractice. But it
should not become morbid; it
should not prevent legitimate
medical practice. If the fear of
malpractice suits becomes a real
phobia, the practice of medicine
will suffocate.
What is most regrettable in the
present case is that the parents
had to have recourse to the law
to exercise their rights and those
of their daughter. One would have
hoped that the doctors and the
hospital would have been more
courageous, and obviated the necessity of bringing the case into
court. The court has now ruled
against the parents. The decision
will undoubtedly be appealed, as
it probably would have been if it
was in their favor. The real tragedy of the case is that neither the
family nor the girl herself will get
any relief. Karen will without
doubt die on the respirator. The
only consolation the parents can
have is that through their efforts
patients and their relatives in the
future may be spared this ordeal.
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